stratfor | Several nations supported the German position from the beginning —
particularly the Eastern European nations that, in addition to opposing Greece
soaking up European money, do not trust Greece's relationship with
Russia. Germany had allies. But it also had major powers as opponents,
and these were brushed aside.
These powerful opponents were brushed aside particularly on two
issues. One was any temporary infusion of cash into Greek banks. The
other was the German demand, in a more extreme way than ever before,
that the Greeks cede fundamental sovereignty over their national economy
and, in effect, over Greece itself. Germany demanded that Greece place
itself under the supervision of a foreign EU monitoring force that, as
Germany demonstrated in these negotiations, ultimately would be under
German control.
The Germans did not want to do this, but what a nation wants to do
and what it will do are two different things. What Germany wanted was
Greek submission to greater austerity in return for support for its
banking system. It was not the government's position that troubled
Germany the most, but the Greek referendum. If Germany forced the Greek
government to capitulate, it was a conventional international
negotiation. If it forced the government to capitulate in the face of
the electoral mandate of the Greek public, it was in many ways an attack
on national sovereignty, forcing a settlement not in opposition to the
government but a direct confrontation with the electorate. The Germans
could not accommodate the vote. They had to respond by demanding
concessions on Greek sovereignty.
This is not over, of course. It is now up to the Greek government to
implement its agreements, and it does so in the face of the Greek
referendum. The situation in Greece is desperate because of the
condition of the banking system. It was the pressure point that the
Germans used to force Greek capitulation. But Greece is now facing not
only austerity, but also foreign governance. The Germans' position is
they do not trust the Greeks. They do not mean the government now, but
the Greek electorate. Therefore, they want monitoring and controls. This
is reasonable from the German point of view, but it will be explosive
to the Greeks.
The Potential for Continental Unease
In World War II, the Germans occupied Greece. As in much of the rest
of Europe, the memory of that occupation is now in the country's DNA.
This will be seen as the return of German occupation, and opponents of
the deal will certainly use that argument. The manner in which the deal
was made and extended by the Germans to provide outside control will
resurrect historical memories of German occupation. It has already
started. The aggressive inflexibility of the Germans can be understood
as an attitude motivated by German fears, but then Germany has always
been a frightened country responding with bravado and self-confidence.
The point of the matter is not going away, and not only because the
Greek response is unpredictable; poverty versus sovereignty is a heady
issue, especially when the Greeks will both remain poor and lose some sovereignty.
The Germans made an example of Cyprus and now Greece. The leading power
of Europe will not underwrite defaulting debtors. It will demand
political submission for what help is given. This is not a message that
will be lost in Europe, whatever the anti-Greek feeling is now.
