stratfor | But the real issue in Egypt has always been something else. Though a
general was forced out of office in 2011, it was not clear that the
military regime did not remain, if not in power, then certainly the
ultimate arbiter of power in Egyptian politics. Over the past year, so
long as Morsi remained the elected president, the argument could be made
that the military had lost its power. But just as we argued that the
fall of Hosni Mubarak had been engineered by the military in order to
force a succession that the aging Mubarak resisted, we can also argue
that while the military had faded into the background, it remained the
decisive force in Egypt.
Modern Egypt was founded in 1952 in a military coup by Col. Gamal Abdel
Nasser. Nasser was committed to modernizing Egypt, and he saw the army
as the only real instrument of modernization. He was a secularist
committed to the idea that Arab nations ought to be united, but not
Islamist by any means. He was a socialist, but not a communist. Above
all else, he was an Egyptian army officer committed to the principle
that the military guaranteed the stability of the Egyptian nation.
When the uprisings of the Arab Spring came, Nasser's successors used
the unrest to force Mubarak out, and then they stepped back. It is
interesting to consider whether they would have been content to retain
their institutional position under a Muslim Brotherhood-led government.
However, Morsi never really took control of the machinery of government,
partly because he was politically weak, partly because the Muslim
Brotherhood was not ready to govern, and partly because the military
never quite let go.
This dynamic culminated in the demonstrations of this "Egyptian
Summer." The opposition leadership appears to support constitutional
democracy. Whether the masses in the streets do as well or whether they
simply dislike the Muslim Brotherhood is difficult to tell, but we
suspect their interests are about food and jobs more than about the
principles of liberalism. Still, there was an uprising, and once again
the military put it to use.
In part, the military did not want to see chaos, and it saw itself as
responsible for averting it. In part, the military distrusted the
Muslim Brotherhood and was happy to see it forced out of office. As in
2011, the army acted overtly to maintain order and simultaneously to
shape the Egyptian political order. They deposed Morsi, effectively
replacing him with a more secular and overtly liberal leadership.
But what must be kept in mind is that, just as in 2011, when the
military was willing to pave the way for Morsi, so too is it now paving
the way for his opposition. And this is the crucial point -- while Egypt
is increasingly unstable, the army is shaping what order might come out
of it. The military is less interested in the ideology of the
government than in containing chaos. Given this mission, it does not see
itself as doing more than stepping back. It does not see itself as
letting go.
The irony of the Egyptian Arab Spring is that while it brought forth
new players, it has not changed the regime or the fundamental
architecture of Egyptian politics. The military remains the dominant
force, and while it is prepared to shape Egypt cleverly, what matters is
that it will continue to shape Egypt.
Therefore, while it is legitimate to discuss a military coup, it is
barely legitimate to do so. What is going on is that there is broad
unhappiness in Egypt that is now free to announce its presence. This
unhappiness takes many ideological paths,
as well as many that have nothing to do with ideology. Standing on
stage with the unhappiness is the military, manipulating, managing and
containing it. Everyone else, all of the politicians, come and go,
playing a short role and moving on -- the military and the crowd caught
in a long, complex and barely comprehensible dance.
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