theminskys | Part 1 of this article
made a case that macroeconomic data does not suggest that there is
rapid automation occurring broadly in the economy nor in large
industries or sectors. Other indicators, like slack in the labor market,
support that assertion. It pointed to periods of rapid automation in
the past as well, and found these were times with generally low
unemployment and healthy job growth.
Regardless
of the data past or present, there are still claims that society is on a
precipice, facing mass unemployment due to wide-scale automation. Many
say that the technology in the near future is different than
developments that occurred in the past, and that instead of slow or
moderate change that the economy can adapt to, the rate of change will
be so profound that suddenly millions will be out-of-work.
There
are good reasons to be suspicious of this narrative. First, it is very
difficult to predict how technology will develop and affect the world,
and if it will be viable or even necessary in the first place. Second,
adopting new technology — for example, automating a process and
replacing workers — and more importantly, the threat
of adopting new technology, gives power to employers and capital
instead of workers. This weaponization of technology needs to be
credible in order to be taken seriously; hence, it relies on the broader
narrative that rapid automation is happening. The first point will be
considered now; the second, in Part 3.
