we're at the second red arrow again...,

alhambrapartners |  The only difference relevant in this overriding conception is that the eurodollar in 1969 was ready to break free of the shackles of hard money.  Its very existence owed to the fact that central banks were repeating the same processes that they had experimented with in the 1920’s and thus felt that they had learned from those mistakes (they didn’t; blaming gold the whole time when economists, deep down, care little for gold so much as power and control).  The eurodollar imbalance of 1969, which led to the great interruption of the 1970’s, was a faction, the majority faction, of banking following along the lines of monetary flexibility; in short, economists thought they would be replacing gold with themselves when even in 1969 it should have been readily apparent thatbanks were replacing gold with their own designs.

One final note, a haunting warning that was echoed in 1979 (itself an echo of 1964) and seemingly destined to be unheeded and thus the source of our great repetition.  If we are doomed to repeat history, it is because the self-selected “best and brightest” are more enamored with their own credentials than their abilities as critical thinkers in a truly enlightened, scientific discipline.  Mr. Coombs’ words from April 1969 would find application in August 2007, again in August 2011 and in increasing regularity since June 2014 and this renewed “rising dollar.”

European central banks remained apprehensive, however, that a serious crunch in the Euro-dollar market might suddenly develop if intensified U.S. and European competition for Euro-dollars suddenly revealed some vulnerable positions. The situation could be particularly serious because the Euro-dollar market had become an increasingly important source of financing for industrial and commercial enterprises not only in Europe but in the whole world. One bankruptcy could attract a lot of attention, and if it led the European commercial banks that had been supplying funds to the market to reassess the credit risks they faced, the result might be a sudden scramble for liquidity. The chances of such a development were enhanced by the fact that no central bank had formal responsibility for the behavior of the Euro-dollar market; what had been accomplished in that connection had been done through informal central bank cooperation.

As noted through this whole discussion, that “informal central bank cooperation” doesn’t really amount to anything.  That lesson could be applied to the Bundesbank “selling dollars” in 1969, the PBOC “selling UST’s” in 2015 or the worthless, useless Federal Reserve RRP in 2016.  They really don’t know what they are doing, they never have and it truly doesn’t matter fixed or floating.  Adjust accordingly because we know how this ends; we’ve already seen it.