NYTimes | The
2014 election of Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his B.J.P. emboldened
every variety of Hindu nationalist group. The primary aim of these
groups is an aggressive form of nationalism. But there is a
contradiction at the heart of this ideology: As Mr. Paz wrote in 1995,
the idea of the nation itself is “incompatible with the institution of
caste.” It was not possible to want everyone to be homogeneous while at
the same time believing them to be fundamentally unequal.
The contradiction presented by caste and nationalism was never clearer than in the searing images that emerged
from Mr. Modi’s own home state, Gujarat, in July. They showed Dalit
boys being stripped and beaten with iron rods. They were accused of
killing a sacred Indian cow. But they claimed they were only skinning a
cow that was already dead, work that is typically reserved for people of
low caste. The irony could not have been more stark: It was caste on
one hand that had forced this occupation upon them, and it was caste
that was degrading them further.
Modernity
should be the natural enemy of caste. And, in many ways, it is. Urban
life, apartment buildings, restaurants — even something as simple as
municipal water and housing — have the power to erase the prohibitions
under which caste functions. Democracy, too, is an enemy of caste: The
low-caste groups form a powerful voting bloc, and so politicians are
obliged to be responsive to them. But by upsetting hierarchies,
modernity can also exacerbate old tensions. It can make the higher
castes, whose numbers are small, insecure about their place in the world
and drive them to reinforce it.
The
spread of modernity in India has certainly undermined caste, but it has
also made the need to assert it more vehement. And the unfolding story
in India is not one about the disappearance of caste, but rather of its
resilience. Brahmins still have an outsize presence in intellectual
life; the armed forces are still dominated by the martial castes; a
majority of rich businessmen and industrialists are still of the
mercantile castes; the lower castes still do the least desirable jobs.
In
the cloistered, English-speaking world where I grew up, caste seemed
hardly to exist. As a child in Delhi, I could no more tell a Brahmin
name like Mishra or Sharma from any other. And even if I could, I would
not have held it in regard. Our only category was class, and it was
determined by privilege, education and how well one spoke English. But
there are some categories so deep that they hold without needing to be
enforced. What I didn’t realize was that in one very important respect,
caste did exist among us: because the lowest castes were not
represented.
For
the last two years, I have been speaking with a Brahmin from Bengal, a
philosopher and a teacher of ancient logic, a man conversant with both
Eastern and Western intellectual traditions. I admire him in many ways —
his immense learning, his defense of tradition in the face of Western
influence — but when I questioned him about the prohibitions of caste he
gave me an answer that turned my stomach.
“If
a person is suffering from a communicable disease, you would not let
him touch your utensils,” he said. “You have this one idea of
contamination, but you refuse to accept that there might be certain
spiritual conditions …” His voice trailed off. He seemed to know that he
had lost me. As if wanting to clear the air, he said: “You have to
understand that modern European culture is based on the idea that all
men are born equal, and later become differentiated. The Indian idea is
different. We believe that men are born unequal, but we are all —
Brahmin, sage, cobbler, outcaste — heading toward the same destiny.”
It
was a valiant attempt at a defense, but in the end absurd. It would
mean that millions of lower-caste Indians, like Rohith Vemula, had to
forfeit the aspirations of this life in exchange for the promise of some
ultimate destiny, many lifetimes away, in which all differences would
be obliterated.
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