energyskeptic | In the past several years, the gap between demand and supply, once
considerable, has steadily narrowed, and today is almost negligible. The
consequences of an actual shortfall of supply would be immense. If
consumption begins to exceed production by even a small amount, the
price of a barrel of oil could soar to triple-digit levels. This, in
turn, could bring on a global recession, a result of exorbitant prices
for transport fuels and for products that rely on petrochemicals — which
is to say, almost every product on the market.
The impact on the American way of life would be profound: cars
cannot be propelled by roof-borne windmills. The suburban and exurban
lifestyles, hinged to two-car families and constant trips to work,
school and Wal-Mart, might become unaffordable or, if gas rationing is
imposed, impossible. Carpools would be the least imposing of many inconveniences; the cost of home heating would soar — assuming, of course, that climate-controlled habitats do not become just a fond memory.
But will such a situation really come to pass? That depends on Saudi
Arabia. To know the answer, you need to know whether the Saudis, who
possess 22 percent of the world’s oil reserves, can increase their
country’s output beyond its current limit of 10.5 million barrels a day,
and even beyond the 12.5-million-barrel target it has set for 2009.
(World consumption is about 84 million barrels a day.) Saudi
Arabia is the sole oil superpower. No other producer possesses reserves
close to its 263 billion barrels, which is almost twice as much as the
runner-up, Iran, with 133 billion barrels.
But the truth about Saudi oil is hard to figure out. Oil reservoirs
cannot be inventoried like wood in a wilderness: the oil is underground,
unseen by geologists and engineers, who can, at best, make highly
educated guesses about how much is underfoot and how much can be
extracted in the future. And there is a further obstacle: the Saudis
will not let outsiders audit their confidential data on reserves and
production. Oil is an industry in which not only is the product hidden
from sight but so is reliable information about it. And because we do
not know when a supply-demand shortfall might arrive, we do not know
when to begin preparing for it, so as to soften its impact; the economic
blow may come as a sledgehammer from the darkness.
For 31 years, Matthew Simmons has prospered as the head of his own
firm, Simmons & Company International, which advises energy
companies on mergers and acquisitions. A member of the Council on
Foreign Relations, a graduate of the Harvard Business School and an
unpaid adviser on energy policy to the 2000 presidential campaign of
George W. Bush, he would be a card-carrying member of the global oil
nomenclatura, if cards were issued for such things. Yet he is one of the
principal reasons the oil world is beginning to ask hard questions of
itself.
Two years ago, Simmons went to Saudi Arabia on a government tour for
business executives. The group was presented with the usual dog-and-pony
show, but instead of being impressed, as most visitors tend to be, with
the size and expertise of the Saudi oil industry, Simmons became
perplexed. As he recalls in his somewhat heretical new book, ”Twilight
in the Desert: The Coming Saudi Oil Shock and the World Economy,” a
senior manager at Aramco told the visitors that ”fuzzy logic” would be
used to estimate the amount of oil that could be recovered. Simmons had
never heard of fuzzy logic. What could be fuzzy about an oil reservoir?
He suspected that Aramco, despite its promises of endless supplies,
might in fact not know how much oil remained to be recovered.
Simmons returned home with an itch to scratch. Saudi Arabia was one
of the charter members of OPEC, founded in 1960 in Baghdad to coordinate
the policies of oil producers. Like every OPEC country, Saudi Arabia
provides only general numbers about its output and reserves; it does not
release details about how much oil is extracted from each reservoir and
what methods are used to extract that oil, and it does not permit
audits by outsiders. The condition of Saudi fields, and those of other
OPEC nations, is a closely guarded secret. That’s largely because OPEC
quotas, which were first imposed in 1983 to limit the output of member
countries, were based on overall reserves; the higher an OPEC member’s
reserves, the higher its quota. It is widely believed that most,
if not all, OPEC members exaggerated the sizes of their reserves in
order to have the largest possible quota — and thus the largest possible
revenue stream.
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