thebulletin | Depending on specifications, drones can be cheap—some quite capable models cost no more than $100—and still theoretically useful in a crude attack on critical infrastructure. Of course, would-be terrorists could acquire much more capable and expensive drones, as well. Controlling the sale of popular and useful tools is difficult. What should the US government, or others, do to reign in the threat drone terror could pose to utilities or other critical infrastructure?
Within the United States, only federal authorities can operate counter-drone systems. The Department of Homeland Security’s 2019 Counter Unmanned Systems Technology Guide, a 33-page booklet about drones and ways to detect and disable them, contains four warnings, in case anyone mistakes the guide’s description of the counter-drone systems for permission to build or acquire them. Counter-drone systems create their own risk to surrounding systems. A drone-jammer does not just jam the signal to the drone, but any signal operating on the same frequency. That could include air traffic control radio, and other critical signals.
But a federal monopoly on these important defenses raises questions about how effective they can be in an emergency.
If a critical infrastructure owner or operator has to call the FBI when they fear a drone attack, any response will mean little, unless counter-drone operators are already on site. A racing drone flying over 100 miles per hour will outrun a federal SUV every time, especially when the drone has a significant head-start.
The Department of Homeland Security has legal authority to protect “covered” facilities and assets, though exactly what types of facilities are protected is unclear from open sources. (And realistically, that information should not be publicly available, because it would provide a clear guide for adversaries on what facilities are unprotected.) Unless the department protects every covered facility, there will be vulnerabilities, because correctly anticipating every terrorist target is impossible/
Growing technology may create opportunities to avoid making tough value trade-offs. The same technology that allows drones to operate remotely or autonomously may be applied to counter-drone systems. A network of remotely-operated or autonomous counter-drone systems stationed at critical infrastructure sites would allow federal authorities to maintain control, while also allowing far more rapid response to drone events. Authorities could manage numerous counter-drone systems dispersed over a whole region from a central location.
Critical infrastructure faces growing risks from drone terrorism. As the stories of Aum, ISIS, and other terror groups show, non-state actors have been using and experimenting with drones since the mid-1990s. At least back then, to obtain them they had to do more than a quick search on Amazon.
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