foreignpolicy | Documents from the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
show that America's nuclear weapons developers were happy to support
the Army's quest for tactical nukes. In 1957, according to an AEC
history, Sandia Corporation President James McRae lamented that
"indiscriminate use of high-yield nuclear weapons inevitably created
adverse public opinion." Since the future of war lay in an "unending
succession of brushfire wars, rather than large-scale conflicts," McRae
recommended that "greater emphasis should be placed on small atomic
weapons," which could be used in "local ground combat."
McRae's
urgings paved the way for the development of the Davy Crockett, a
sub-kiloton-yield nuclear rocket that could fit on the back of a jeep.
In 1958, when the Army came knocking for an atomic demolition munition
that could be carried by a single soldier, the AEC looked
to the Crockett's lightweight Mark 54 warhead for its solution. The
resulting weapon would be a smaller, more mobile version of the ADMs. The Army, though, would have to share the device with the Navy and Marine Corps.
The AEC's
final product -- the B-54 Special Atomic Demolition Munition -- entered
the U.S. arsenal in 1964. It stood 18 inches tall, encased in an
aluminum and fiberglass frame. It rounded to a bullet shape on one end
and had a 12-inch-diameter control panel on the other. According to an
Army manual, the weapon's maximum explosive yield was less than 1
kiloton -- that is, the equivalent of a thousand tons of TNT. To protect the bomb from unauthorized use, the SADM's
control panel was sealed by a cover plate secured by a combination
lock. Glow-in-the-dark paint applied to the lock allowed troops to
unlock the bomb at night.
As Soviet forces advanced into such countries as West Germany, the SADM
would allow Special Forces units (dubbed "Green Light" teams) to deploy
behind enemy lines to destroy infrastructure and matériel. But their
mission wouldn't have been limited to NATO countries alone. What many nuclear historians don't realize is that Special Forces Green Light teams were also prepared to use SADMs
on territory of the Warsaw Pact itself in order to thwart an invasion.
The teams prepared to destroy enemy airfields, tank depots, nodes in the
anti-aircraft grid, and any potentially useful transportation
infrastructure in order to mitigate the flood of enemy armor and to
allow allied air power to punch through. According to an internal
report, the Army also considered burying SADMs next to enemy bunkers "to destroy critical field command and communications installations."
Navy
SEALs and Army Special Forces were trained to reach their targets by
air, land, and sea. They could parachute behind enemy lines from cargo planes or helicopters. Teams specializing in scuba missions could swim the bomb to its destination if necessary. (The AEC
built an airtight, pressurized case that allowed divers to submerge the
bomb to depths of up to 200 feet.) One Special Forces team even trained
to ski with the weapon in the Bavarian Alps, though not without some
difficulty. "It skied down the mountain; you did not," said Bill Flavin,
who commanded a Special Forces SADM team. "If it shifted just a little bit, that was it. You were out of control on the slopes with that thing."
Special Forces thus turned to teams trained in special high-altitude
parachute jumps and scuba diving to deliver the weapon. Team leaders
were allowed to choose which of their men would receive training on the
weapon in order to make sure their units could pass the Army's periodic,
demanding nuclear surety inspections. "The people with the best
records, the people with the most experience, usually ended up on the SADM team because they had to pass the surety inspection," said Flavin. To receive SADM
qualification, soldiers also had to be screened through the Defense
Department's personnel reliability program to make sure they were
trustworthy and mentally stable.
Some men approached for the mission were gung-ho; others were less so. "Of course everybody would volunteer. That wasn't a problem," said Capt. Davis. "We did it because, hey, it was gee-whiz.
It was a neat thing to do, and I wanted to learn about it." But when
Green Light team member Ken Richter began interviewing potential
candidates, he said, not everyone was as enthusiastic: "I had a lot of
people that I interviewed for our team. Once they found out what the
mission was, they said, 'No, thanks. I'd rather go back to Vietnam.'"
