theatlantic | Little distinguishes democracy in
America more sharply from Europe than the primacy—and permissiveness—of
our commitment to free speech. Yet ongoing controversies at American
universities suggest that free speech is becoming a partisan issue.
While conservative students defend the importance of inviting
controversial speakers to campus and giving offense, many
self-identified liberals are engaged in increasingly disruptive, even
violent, efforts to shut them down. Free speech for some, they argue,
serves only to silence and exclude others. Denying hateful or
historically “privileged” voices a platform is thus necessary to make equality effective, so that the marginalized and vulnerable can finally speak up—and be heard.
The reason that appeals to the First Amendment cannot decide these campus controversies is because there is a more fundamental conflict between two, very different concepts of free speech at stake. The conflict between what the ancient Greeks called isegoria, on the one hand, and parrhesia, on the other, is as old as democracy itself. Today, both terms are often translated as “freedom of speech,” but their meanings were and are importantly distinct. In ancient Athens, isegoria described the equal right of citizens to participate in public debate in the democratic assembly; parrhesia, the license to say what one pleased, how and when one pleased, and to whom.
When it comes to private universities, businesses, or social media, the would-be censors are our fellow-citizens, not the state. Private entities like Facebook or Twitter, not to mention Yale or Middlebury, have broad rights to regulate and exclude the speech of their members. Likewise, online mobs are made up of outraged individuals exercising their own right to speak freely. To invoke the First Amendment in such cases is not a knock-down argument, it’s a non sequitur.
John Stuart Mill argued that the chief threat to free speech in democracies was not the state, but the “social tyranny” of one’s fellow citizens. And yet today, the civil libertarians who style themselves as Mill’s inheritors have for the most part failed to refute, or even address, the arguments about free speech and equality that their opponents are making.
The
two ancient concepts of free speech came to shape our modern liberal
democratic notions in fascinating and forgotten ways. But more
importantly, understanding that there is not one, but two concepts
of freedom of speech, and that these are often in tension if not
outright conflict, helps explain the frustrating shape of contemporary
debates, both in the U.S. and in Europe—and why it so often feels as
though we are talking past each other when it comes to the things that
matter most.
