NYTimes | THE Russian president, Vladimir V. Putin, continues to surprise. Russia’s military intervention in Syria, followed by a face-to-face meeting in Moscow this week with that country’s president, Bashar al-Assad, has startled the world.
As
there was after Mr. Putin’s action in Ukraine last year, there has been
a chorus of commentary on his supposed strategic genius. He is acting
decisively, seizing the initiative and creating facts on the ground — so
the narrative goes, in contrast with the West’s feckless pursuits in
Syria.
The opposite is true.
Five
years ago, Russia was in a much stronger position, both at home and in
the world. Today, Mr. Putin is playing defense, doubling down on bad
decisions guided by an outdated theory of international politics.
Recognition
of Russia’s mistakes, however, does not guarantee future failure. The
United States and our allies cannot stand idly by and wait for Russia to
fail. Instead, we must adopt a comprehensive strategy to minimize the
negative consequences of Russia’s actions and maximize the positive ones
of ours.....
.....For
different reasons, societies in the Arab world, Ukraine and Russia
began to mobilize against their leaders. Initially, President Medvedev
sided with the people in the Middle East, notably abstaining
from, rather than vetoing, the Security Council resolution that
authorized the use of force in Libya. Mr. Medvedev also engaged with
opposition leaders in Russia and introduced some modest political
reforms before exiting the Kremlin in May 2012.
Mr.
Putin, however, had an opposite approach. He believed that behind these
protesters was an American hand, and that the response to them —
whether in Syria, Egypt, Russia or Ukraine — should be coercion and
force.
After
his inauguration as president, Mr. Putin pivoted hard against Russia’s
demonstrators, labeling them traitors. His tactics derailed the
opposition’s momentum.
But
his short-term successes have produced long-term costs. Mr. Putin’s
paranoia about independent political actors nurtured a growing fear of
business interests outside his oligarchical clique. Economic reform
stalled, investment declined and state ownership grew.
Political
stagnation also settled in. For the first two years of his third term
as president, Mr. Putin’s approval rating hovered around 60 percent, his
lowest ever. Only his invasion of Ukraine eventually propelled his approval rating back up.
