valdaiclub | In the
event that the growing conflict in and around Ukraine does not lead
to irreparable consequences on a global scale in the near future, its
most important result will be a fundamental demarcation between Russia
and Europe, which will make it impossible to maintain even insignificant
neutral zones and will require a significant reduction in trade and
economic ties. Restoring control over the territory of Ukraine, which,
most likely, should become a long-term goal of Russian foreign policy,
will solve the main problem of regional security — the presence
of a “grey zone”, the management of which inevitably becomes the subject
of a confrontation that is dangerous from the point of view
of escalation. In this sense, we can count on a certain stabilisation
in the long term, although it will not be based on cooperation between
the main regional powers. However, it is already obvious that the road
to peace will be long enough and will be accompanied by extremely
dangerous situations.
In his speech to the participants in the Davos forum, Henry Kissinger,
the patriarch of international politics, pointed to just such
a prospect as the least desirable from his point of view, since Russia
then “could alienate itself completely from Europe and seek a permanent
alliance elsewhere”, which would lead to the emergence of diplomatic
distances on the scale of the Cold War. In his opinion, peace talks
between the parties would be the most expedient way to prevent this;
these would result in Russian interests being taken into account. For
Kissinger, this means that in some respect, Russia’s participation
in the European “concert” is an unconditional value, and the loss
of this must be prevented as long as some chance remains.
However, with all the highest appreciation of the merits and wisdom
of this statesman and scholar, the impeccable logic of Henry Kissinger
faces only one obstacle — it works when the balance of power
is determined and relations between states have already passed the stage
of military conflict. In this sense, he certainly follows in the
footsteps of his great predecessors — Chancellor of the Austrian Empire
Klemens von Metternich and British Foreign Secretary Viscount
Castlereagh, whose diplomatic achievements were the subject
of Kissinger’s doctoral dissertation in 1956. Both of them went down
in history precisely as the creators of the new European order,
established after the end of the Napoleonic era in France and which
persisted, with minor adjustments, for almost a century in international
politics.
Like his great predecessors, Kissinger appears on the world stage
in an era when the balance of power between the most important players
is already being determined by “iron and blood.” The time of his
greatest achievement was the first half of the 1970s — a period
of relative stability. However, one cannot ignore the fact that the
ability of states to behave in that way was due not to their wisdom
or responsibility to future generations, but to much more mundane
factors. The first factor was the completion of the “shrinkage” of the
order which obtained its approximate features as a result of the World
War II. Over the next 25 years (1945 — 1970), this order was “finalised”
during the war in Korea, the US intervention in Vietnam, the USSR’s
military actions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, several indirect wars
between the USSR and the US in the Middle East, the completion of the
process of disintegration of the European colonial empires, as well
as a significant number of smaller, but also dramatic events. So now
it would be difficult to expect diplomacy to be able to take first place
in world affairs at the initial stage of the process, which promises
to be very long and, most likely, quite bloody.
The material basis of that order, which was given its final polish
by Kissinger’s diplomacy, the policy of “détente” with the USSR and the
1972 reconciliation with China, was the strategic defeat of Europe
as a result of two world wars in the first half of the 20th century. The
collapse of the European colonial empires and the historic defeat
of Germany in its attempt to take centre stage in world affairs brought
the United States to the forefront, which made it possible to make
politics truly global. As a result of the self-destruction of the USSR,
this order turned out to be short-lived. We see now that this was
a great tragedy, since it led to the disappearance of the balance
of power in favour of the dominance of only one power.
Now we can assume that the massive emancipation of mankind from
Western control is of central importance, the most important factor
of which is the growth of China’s economic and political power. If China
itself, as well as India and other major states outside the West, cope
with the task entrusted to them by history, in the coming decades the
international system will acquire features that were completely
uncharacteristic before.
Most of the significant events that are taking place now, both
globally and regionally, are connected with the objective process of the
growth in the importance of China and, following it, other large Asian
countries. The determination Russia has shown in recent years, and
especially months, is also associated with global changes. The fact that
Moscow so purposefully stood up to protect its interests and values was
due not only to domestic Russian reasons, although they are of great
importance. Nor were they predicated upon expectations of direct
material assistance from China, which could compensate for the losses
during the acute phase of the conflict with the West.